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I. INTRODUCTION 
State courts are paramount in defining the constitutional right to vote. This 
primacy of state courts exists in part because the right to vote is a state-based 
                                                                                                                     
 * Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Kentucky College of Law. Thanks to the Proteus Fund for supporting this research. I am 
grateful to many scholars who read early drafts and helped me strengthen this Article, 
including Dmitry Bam, Ned Foley, Jim Gardner, Ellen Katz, Lisa Manheim, Gene Mazo, 
Derek Muller, Mike Pitts, David Schleicher, Jordan Singer, Michael Solimine, and Franita 
Tolson. Patrick Barsotti and Chris Stewart provided invaluable research assistance. I am 
honored and humbled that Professor Derek Muller wrote a gracious response to this Article 
in the Ohio State Law Journal’s online publication. See Derek T. Muller, Complexity 
Confronting State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 65 (2016). 
© Proteus Fund, reprinted with permission. 
2 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1 
right protected under state constitutions.1 In addition, election administration is 
largely state-driven, with states regulating most of the rules for casting and 
counting ballots.2 State law thus guarantees—and state courts interpret—the 
voting rights that we cherish so much as a society. State courts that issue 
rulings broadly defining the constitutional right to vote best protect the most 
fundamental right in our democracy; state decisions that constrain voting to a 
narrower scope do harm to that ideal.  
Even though state courts are the primary actors in shaping the right to 
vote, however, most people pay less attention to state judges than to their 
federal counterparts. The media, for example, spend relatively little time 
covering state voting rights decisions.3 Most election law scholars focus 
primarily on decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court.4 This emphasis is 
inherently backward given how active state courts are in regulating the voting 
process.5 From voter ID, to felon disenfranchisement, to the mechanics of 
Election Day, state courts are intimately involved in setting out the rules for an 
election and giving scope to the constitutional right to vote. For example, 
federal courts have issued far fewer opinions on voter ID laws than state courts 
have in the past decade,6 and yet the federal court opinions have received most 
of the attention from scholars, the media, and the public.7  
Why do federal court decisions regarding the right to vote seem more 
prominent than state cases? For one, U.S. Supreme Court opinions apply 
nationwide, resulting in immense and justifiable scrutiny when the Court 
renders decisions on issues of high salience, such as voting rights. With 
respect to lower courts, federal judges have a larger geographic reach than 
their state counterparts.8 Further, federal constitutional rulings are based on the 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89, 101–03 (2014) (noting that forty-nine of fifty states explicitly confer the right to 
vote to the state’s citizens, and the only exception, Arizona, still requires elections to be 
“free and equal,” which its courts have interpreted as granting the right to vote). 
 2 See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of 
State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 354–55 (2008) (noting that state legislatures are the primary 
source of laws regulating election administration). 
 3 See infra Part II.B. The media also spend very little time covering state judicial 
elections. See Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 567 
(2014) (citing Martin Kaplan et al., Local News Coverage of the 2004 Campaign: An 
Analysis of Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets, LOC. NEWS ARCHIVE 9–12, 28–29 (Feb. 15, 
2005), http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf). 
 4 See infra Part II.C. 
 5 As a general matter state courts issue thousands more decisions than federal courts 
every year, affecting millions more people. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public 
Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 456–57 (2010). 
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 Federal appellate courts, for example, cover multiple states, and federal trial 
districts are larger than state trial districts. Compare, e.g., Geographic Boundaries of 
United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. CTS., 
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U.S. Constitution, which obviously has more prominence than (and supremacy 
over) state constitutions.9  
But as this Article shows—through a detailed, comparative examination of 
state court cases involving the voting process—state judges are often the main 
actors in defining the constitutional right to vote under their state constitutions, 
which then impact the meaning of voting rights in federal elections as well.10 
Yet the decisions deviate markedly across states on the protection afforded to 
voting, with some judges issuing broad pronouncements on the primacy of the 
right to vote and other judges more narrowly construing the constitutional 
safeguard. If we want to preserve the right to vote as the most fundamental and 
foundational right in our democracy, then we need to recognize this 
divergence so that we can devise strategies to encourage broader rulings.  
We should favor a broad analysis of the constitutional right to vote 
because voting is the most important, fundamental right that underlies our 
entire democracy.11 Voting should be as easy as practically possible for all 
eligible voters, tempered only with whatever regulation is required that does 
not unnecessarily cause disenfranchisement; the foundation of our democracy 
begins with individuals going to the polls to select leaders to govern them.12 
Achieving this robust protection requires a comprehensive understanding of 
how state judges rule in these cases, accompanied by a call for state judges to 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD8A-2ZQP], 
with Kentucky Court of Justice Judicial Circuits, KY. CT. JUSTICE, http://courts.ky.gov/ 
resources/publicationsresources/Publications/P107KYJudicialCircuitsMap85x11_211web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5HG2-YK4Y] (showing the significantly larger geographical reach of 
federal courts in comparison to state trial districts). 
 9 Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 
1605 (2010) (citing a study which found that forty-eight percent of respondents were 
unaware that their state had a constitution).  
 10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that “the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature”); id. amend. XVII (same for U.S. Senators); see also Franita Tolson, 
Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 159, 164 (2015) (arguing that, in defining voting rights, “Article I, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution incorporates state substantive law governing voter qualifications as 
well as democratic norms regarding access to the franchise that were nascent during the 
founding era, but quickly developed over the course of the nineteenth century”). 
 11 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Participation: A Response 
to Professor Flanders, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 81, 99 (2013). 
 12 Id. This Article begins with the premise that voting is the most important right in 
our democracy and that therefore we should favor judicial decisions and judges who will 
protect that right broadly. For a further discussion of why courts should robustly construe 
the constitutional right to vote, see id. at 81 (“Voting is the foundational concept for our 
entire democratic structure. We think of voting as a fundamental—the most fundamental—
right in our democracy. When a group of citizens collectively elects its representatives, it 
affirms the notion that we govern ourselves by free choice. An individual’s right to vote 
ties that person to our social order, even if that person chooses not to exercise that right. 
Voting represents the beginning; everything else in our democracy follows the right to 
vote. Participation is more than just a value. It is a foundational virtue of our democracy.”). 
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construe their state constitution’s grant of voting rights to the fullest extent 
possible. In addition, the analysis of state judicial decisions on the right to vote 
can help us discern how ideology and judicial selection may influence whether 
a judge is likely to interpret the right to vote broadly or narrowly, thereby 
adding to the debate over the kinds of state judges we want on the bench.  
Analyzing state court cases on the right to vote in a detailed manner will 
have a significant effect nationwide. Many state court opinions rely on 
decisions from other states, especially when considering similar issues. When 
a state court faces an important election law case, such as one about a voter ID 
requirement, it is going to consider the views of its sister states.13 Federal 
courts also look to state jurisprudence. Thus, state courts do not issue decisions 
in a vacuum; the cases are often interrelated. Increased scrutiny on how state 
courts have decided these issues can illuminate why state judges should rule 
broadly on voting rights, which can have a multiplying effect in other states.  
Following this Introduction in Part I, Part II shows how our outsized focus 
on federal courts, at the expense of state courts, is misplaced. It first examines 
the importance of state courts in deciding constitutional law issues. It then 
compares the differences in media and scholarly attention for federal versus 
state right-to-vote decisions, demonstrating how our discussion over voting 
rights cases is disproportionately skewed toward federal courts even though 
state judges do more of the work in this realm. Part III dives into the state 
cases in three specific areas as representative samples: voter ID, felon 
disenfranchisement, and the voting process; this final category includes 
decisions on electronic voting machines, extending polling hours on Election 
Day, and counting absentee ballots. By examining over thirty state court cases 
issued in the last decade, this Part demonstrates just how involved state courts 
have been in shaping the meaning of the constitutional right to vote. It also 
shows how state judges differ on whether they interpret the right to vote 
broadly or narrowly—that is, whether judges robustly construe their 
constitutions as going beyond the federal constitution in protecting voters, or 
instead narrowly view their constitutions as merely coterminous with the U.S. 
Constitution. Part IV then looks at whether a judge’s ideology or the judicial 
selection method may correlate with the scope of a right-to-vote decision. 
Although further quantitative empirical studies are needed, as a preliminary 
finding, the evidence in Part IV shows that liberal-leaning judges are more 
likely to construe the right to vote broadly as compared to conservative jurists, 
especially for partisan-laden issues such as voter ID. In addition, appointed 
judges seem more likely than elected judges to define the right to vote 
robustly, at least for certain topics such as felon disenfranchisement. This 
analysis can contribute to the existing debate over who we want as judges as 
well as offer insights on the preferable method of judicial selection. 
                                                                                                                     
 13 Indeed, many of the state court cases discussed in Part III have done just that, with 
state courts looking to their sister state courts as part of the analysis. See infra Part III. 
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Ultimately, providing the most robust protection for the constitutional 
right to vote requires us, as scholars and advocates, to understand both how 
state courts construe these rights and how ideology and judicial selection may 
influence the state judges who issue these opinions. This Article begins that 
process. 
II. STATE JUDGES AND VOTING LITIGATION 
State judges decide thousands of constitutional law cases every year and 
numerous cases involving the right to vote. Yet both the media and scholars 
have largely ignored state courts and their effect on voting rights. Instead, the 
focus is primarily on federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. To 
understand the true meaning of the constitutional right to vote, however, we 
need to look more closely at state judges and how they rule in these cases. 
A. State Courts and Constitutional Law 
State supreme courts decide around 2,000 constitutional law cases every 
year, while the U.S. Supreme Court issues only about thirty.14 Yet both 
scholars and the media assiduously cover the U.S. Supreme Court and give 
correspondingly little consideration to state supreme courts,15 unless a state 
court issues a decision of high public salience such as one involving same-sex 
marriage.16 That is, most constitutional law is promulgated in state judiciaries, 
yet as a society we pay relatively little attention to that phenomenon.17  
Constitutional law cases involve some of the most important issues a court 
decides because of their impact on the structure of democratic governance, yet 
“[t]he public generally ‘lacks sufficient information to have clear, considered, 
and internally consistent judgments about exactly what the judicial role under 
the Constitution either is or ought to be.’”18 But the public should care about 
the ways in which state courts decide these cases. Indeed, “[b]ecause state 
courts are closer to the people, their operations may be critical to ‘popular 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 456–57. 
 15 See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 16 See, e.g., Associated Press, N.J. Supreme Court to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Case, 
CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-supreme-court-to-hear-
same-sex-marriage-case [https://perma.cc/HMR7-G3UN]. 
 17 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: 
Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1629, 1635 (2010) (“Over the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S. Supreme 
Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in their home states and 
throughout the nation.”). 
 18 Bam, supra note 3, at 567 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the 
Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1825 (2005)). 
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constitutionalism’s objective of reasserting democratic control over 
[constitutional] meaning.’”19 
The lack of attention to state courts means that citizens—who vote to elect 
or retain judges in thirty-nine states20—have woefully little information to 
assist them in making their choices.21 As one scholar notes, “the voter 
ignorance problem is particularly acute in judicial elections because of the 
nature of the judicial office, the opaqueness of judicial performance, and the 
lack of useful cues and heuristics that allow voters to compensate for their lack 
of relevant knowledge.”22 Voters therefore use proxies such as the candidate’s 
name, sex, ethnicity, or party affiliation to guide their decisions.23  
A renewed focus on state courts and how they interpret important 
constitutional principles will help those who select our state judges—voters, 
Governors, or independent commissions—base their choices on more relevant 
factors, such as the judges’ likely ability to analyze these constitutional issues 
in a way that best comports with the ideals of popular democracy. An 
evaluation of state right-to-vote cases might also tell us whether elected versus 
appointed judges are better at broadly construing the state-conferred 
constitutional right to vote.24 If voting is the most fundamental right in our 
                                                                                                                     
 19 David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2047, 2067 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal 
Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1003, 1023 (2006)). 
 20 See Benjamin R. Hardy, Note, Judicial Selection Question: Why Is It Time for 
Preemptive Reform of Kentucky’s Judicial Selection Method?, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
379, 386 (2014) (discussing the various methods by which judges are selected throughout 
the states). 
 21 See Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective 
Performance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725, 726 
(2007) (noting that “all too frequently voters are confronted at the polls with an 
‘information problem’: they face a slate of judicial candidates about which they know 
nothing particularly relevant, or even nothing at all”). As another study showed,  
[m]any people, including those that had previously voted in a judicial election, do not 
even know that judges in their state are elected. While at least some people can name 
a Supreme Court Justice or two, most voters are unable to name a single state court 
judge, at any level of the state judiciary.  
Bam, supra note 3, at 568 (footnote omitted). 
 22 Bam, supra note 3, at 565–66. 
 23 See Singer, supra note 21, at 727–28. Professor Singer notes that “a significant 
number of voters apparently cast a vote without any rationale whatsoever,” highlighting 
one study in which “38% of those surveyed who had just cast a vote could not articulate a 
reason why they had voted the way they did.” Id. at 728; see also ILYA SOMIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 3–4 
(2013) (concluding that Americans are generally too ignorant about politics and civic 
affairs to govern themselves on a national scale). 
 24 See infra Part IV.B. 
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democracy,25 then we should favor judges who will issue rulings that robustly 
protect that right for all voters. 
B. State Courts, Voting Rights, and (Lack of) Media Coverage 
Studies show that there is woefully little media coverage of state court 
decisions.26 This inattention to state courts is in spite of the fact that every year 
state judges shape the meaning of the constitutional right to vote, one of the 
most cherished rights in our democracy. Although the media pay greater 
attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions involving voting rights, state 
courts issue more opinions than federal courts that define the scope of our 
participatory democracy.27 Moreover, many state court election law cases are 
more significant than their federal counterparts because they often define 
voting itself, which is ultimately a state-based right under state constitutions.28 
As a society, we must not ignore these important institutions. 
The national media’s attention, however, is skewed dramatically toward 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s voting rights decisions. For instance, in 2012—a 
presidential election year—the U.S. Supreme Court decided only two cases 
that arguably impacted the constitutional right to vote: Perry v. Perez29 and 
Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission,30 both about redistricting.31 These 
decisions received outsized attention in the media. The Perry v. Perez opinion, 
reversing the lower court’s decision on Texas’s redistricting, was reported in 
national newspapers32 and was the subject of editorials in both the New York 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See Douglas, supra note 11, at 81. 
 26 See Richard L. Vining, Jr. & Teena Wilhelm, Explaining High-Profile Coverage of 
State Supreme Court Decisions, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 704, 720–21 (2010) (noting that “[w]hen 
the premier print media outlets in the U.S. states cover courts of last resort, it is primarily 
due to either the characteristics of decisions or bench politics”). 
 27 See Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for 
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
101, 103 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (noting that “state court cases have made 
up a majority of election challenge cases heard in the courts in every year but one in the 
last twelve years”). 
 28 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 95–105. 
 29 Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam). 
 30 Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012). 
 31 The Court also issued an important decision on campaign finance, American 
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012), that required state 
courts to apply the holding of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), to state law. In 
addition, it summarily affirmed, without comment, a lower court decision on campaign 
finance in Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.). 
 32 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Sides with Texas on Redistricting Plan, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-sides-with-
texas-on-redistricting-plan/2012/01/20/gIQAzjBhDQ_story.html [https://perma.cc/TGV5-
MXFZ]. 
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Times33 and the Wall Street Journal.34 The Tennant case, about West 
Virginia’s redistricting, did not garner as much editorial commentary, but it 
still made national news in publications such as the New York Times,35 as well 
as the Associated Press36 and Reuters37 news services. 
By contrast, that same year, state supreme courts issued numerous 
decisions that affected the upcoming election, but these cases generally 
received scant media attention. For instance, shortly before the candidate filing 
deadline, the Missouri Supreme Court rendered an opinion calling into 
question the state’s redistricting for congressional districts, yet the case made 
barely a ripple beyond Missouri’s borders.38 Few national publications picked 
up the story, and when they did, they simply ran the Associated Press’s short 
summary as part of their regional coverage.39 Similarly, there were very few 
stories40 about the Minnesota Supreme Court’s August 2012 decision rejecting 
a challenge to a ballot proposition that, if the voters had passed it, would have 
added a voter ID requirement to Minnesota’s Constitution.41 The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court issued a contentious 3–2 decision, with a vigorous dissent, 
denying a manual recount in a primary for a state house seat,42 and yet the 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See Editorial, Redistricting in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/opinion/redistricting-in-texas.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XMU4-PPZX]. 
 34 See Editorial, Holder’s Texas Defeat, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204301404577173030198183616 [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3KZ-5DTL]. 
 35 See Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Map for West Virginia Voting, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/us/politics/supreme-court-upholds-
w-virginia-voter-map.html [https://perma.cc/4GGF-43KF]. 
 36 See Associated Press, Justices Back New Districts in West Virginia,  
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/09/25/high-
court-upholds-west-virginia-congressional-districts/9Oym6x9FlmyU09knuUokaM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3ETA-QS73]. 
 37 See Terry Baynes & Jonathan Stempel, Supreme Court Upholds West Virginia 
Redistricting, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
westvirginia-elections-idUSBRE88O0S820120925 [https://perma.cc/PMB3-A92G]. 
 38 Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Mo. 2012). 
 39 See Associated Press, Missouri: Court Rejects State Redistricting Map,  
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/us/missouri-court-
rejects-state-redistricting-map.html [https://perma.cc/MXG6-PAUW]. 
 40 A search of news stories for “Minnesota” and “voter ID” within a week of the 
decision produced very few relevant hits beyond an Associated Press alert on the website 
Real Clear Politics. See Martiga Lohn & Patrick Condon, Minnesota Court Rejects 
Challenge to Photo ID, REAL CLEAR POL. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ 
news/ap/politics/2012/Aug/27/minnesota_court_rejects_challenge_to_photo_id.html [https:// 
perma.cc/V9NP-2HXC]. 
 41 League of Women Voters of Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. 2012) 
(per curiam). 
 42 Tobon v. R.I. Bd. of Elections, 62 A.3d 1126, 1126, 1128 (R.I. 2012). 
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only significant news coverage was from a local paper.43 These are just a few 
examples of important state court election law cases that failed to garner any 
national attention.44 
To be sure, the media sometimes provide greater coverage of a state case 
involving a hot-button issue, such as a ruling on the constitutionality of a voter 
ID law. For instance, national media reported a Pennsylvania trial court 
decision45 upholding that state’s voter ID requirement.46 Then again, beyond a 
short story in the Associated Press (reprinted in various publications, including 
the New York Times),47 the national media were largely silent when, just a 
week before Election Day, a Tennessee appellate court upheld that state’s 
voter ID law while ruling that Memphis voters could show their City of 
Memphis library card to prove their identity at the polls.48 Perhaps the fact that 
Pennsylvania is considered a “swing” state while Tennessee is not led the 
national media to report the Pennsylvania opinion and not the Tennessee case, 
even though each decision played a significant role in the conduct of the 
election in its respective state. 
Similarly, the national media paid a lot more attention to a federal district 
court decision striking down Wisconsin’s voter ID law than it did to similar 
decisions just two years earlier by Wisconsin state trial judges. The federal 
court case49 was the subject of a New York Times Editorial.50 By contrast, the 
                                                                                                                     
 43 See Katherine Gregg, Pawtucket—High Court Denies Hand Recount in R.I. House 
Race, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 6, 2012, at 1. 
 44 By contrast, in 2014 the national media did cover a Florida trial court’s decision 
invalidating that state’s congressional districting plan, perhaps because it was one of the 
first decisions to throw out a redistricting scheme for unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering. See Robert Barnes, Florida Judge Takes on Gerrymandering;  
Sets Stage for Supreme Court Cases in Fall, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/florida-judge-takes-on-gerrymandering-
sets-stage-for-supreme-court-cases-in-fall/2014/08/03/df7ccb88-18e7-11e4-85b6-c1451e62 
2637_story.html [https://perma.cc/4VNB-FFKF]. 
 45 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *32 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam). 
 46 E.g., Ethan Bronner, Pennsylvania Judge Keeps Voter ID Law Intact on Its Way to 
Higher Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/ 
politics/pennsylvania-judge-keeps-voter-id-law-intact.html [https://perma.cc/8FLX-7E5F]; 
see Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); see also Robert 
Barnes, Pennsylvania Voter ID Law Sent Back to Lower Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/pennsylvania-voter-id-law-
sent-back-to-lower-court/2012/09/18/ded55652-01b8-11e2-b257-e1c2b3548a4a_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/7JHB-U6XT]. 
 47 Associated Press, Tennessee: Court Upholds Voter Identification Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/us/tennessee-court-upholds-voter-
identification-law.html [https://perma.cc/94ES-5JNY]. 
 48 City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5265006, 
at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012), aff’d, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013). 
 49 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 
(7th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
10 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1 
New York Times mentioned the Wisconsin state court opinions only briefly as 
part of a broader discussion over voter ID, including them within an analysis 
of the Department of Justice’s decision to block Texas’s voter ID law that 
same week.51 Similarly, major newspapers around the country printed an 
Associated Press article about the 2014 federal trial court ruling, but these 
same publications made little mention of the similar 2012 state trial court 
decisions.52  
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the media should not cover 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on voting rights. As the nation’s highest court, 
the U.S. Supreme Court and its decisions are inherently newsworthy; its 
rulings can also play into a pre-existing storyline, such as how the Texas 
redistricting case exemplified the clash between Southern states and the 
Department of Justice.53 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions apply 
nationwide, while individual state court rulings directly affect only voters in 
those states. Indeed, local media may adequately cover a state court decision 
that impacts that state’s elections.  
But limiting coverage to local media or to federal court decisions makes it 
harder for the public to recognize the broader message: state courts widely 
influence how we understand the right to vote. Even if local voters know about 
a particular state court decision, this limited awareness obscures the reality 
that, everywhere in the country, state courts make important rulings on voting 
rights. It is therefore curious that state court judgments, which in the aggregate 
have a larger impact on the electoral process and can have effects across 
borders as other state and federal courts rely on them, receive comparatively 
scant attention from the media and the public. The lack of attention to state 
courts diminishes the public’s awareness of how these institutions shape 
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote.54 The news media need not stop 
covering the federal courts, but they should also give greater attention to state 
courts and their election law decisions.  
                                                                                                                     
 50 See Editorial, Voter ID Is the Real Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/voter-id-is-the-real-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/ 
P3WP-ZRXV]. 
 51 See, e.g., Editorial, A Rejection of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/opinion/a-rejection-of-discrimination.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Y2Q2-H98N]. 
 52 See, e.g., Dinesh Ramde, AP, Federal Judge Strikes Down Wisconsin Voter ID 
Law, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/ 
nation/article/Federal-judge-strikes-down-Wisconsin-voter-ID-law-5439627.php [https:// 
perma.cc/JLD7-89N9]. 
 53 See Adam Liptak, Justices’ Texas Redistricting Ruling Likely to Help G.O.P.,  
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/us/supreme-court-rejects-
judge-drawn-maps-in-texas-redistricting-case.html [https://perma.cc/8ZEA-QMJP]. 
 54 See Vining & Wilhelm, supra note 26, at 721. 
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C. Scholarly Attention to State Courts and the Right to Vote 
The media are not the only culprits in focusing too heavily on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s election law cases at the expense of state court jurisprudence. 
Scholars, too, have spent most of their energy dissecting only the key U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent in this area. In comparison, there has been little 
scholarship on the role of state courts in shaping the constitutional right to 
vote. As Professor Adam Winkler has written,  
Election law scholars have paid insufficient attention to state court 
adjudication of laws regulating electoral politics. The focus has been on 
federal law and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, even though each of the fifty 
states has its own set of detailed election regulations. Not only is state law a 
diverse, plentiful, and untapped lode for study, but state courts have 
historically exercised the responsibility to decide the constitutionality of 
state-level electoral reforms prior to the federal courts. It is to the state courts, 
therefore, that one must often look to discover the doctrinal foundations of 
election law, laid by state judges when first confronted with challenges to 
reforms.55 
Yet virtually all recent scholarship on the right to vote has focused either 
on U.S. Supreme Court cases or has isolated a single state’s jurisprudence.56 
There have been very few articles looking at state courts holistically or 
comparatively to discern how they affect voting rights.57 For example, just a 
week after the 2012 presidential election, the George Washington Law Review 
hosted a symposium on political law, and the law review itself published 
articles from that event.58 All of the articles in that issue considering voting 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political Party 
Regulation in the State Courts, 1886–1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2000). 
 56 Although a few prior articles have focused on specific states, there is little scholarly 
commentary—besides my own previous work—providing a broad-based and holistic look 
at the role of state courts in shaping the constitutional right to vote. See Douglas, supra 
note 1, at 89. For examples of scholarship examining a single state, see Matthew C. Jones, 
Fraud and the Franchise: The Pennsylvania Constitution’s “Free and Equal Election” 
Clause as an Independent Basis for State and Local Election Challenges, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 
1473, 1475 (1995); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the 
Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1986); and Hannah Tokerud, 
Comment, The Right of Suffrage in Montana: Voting Protections Under the State 
Constitution, 74 MONT. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2013). 
 57 One recent exception is a “working paper” comparing four state Voting Rights 
Acts. See Paige A. Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through State Voting 
Rights Acts 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 474, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2422915 [https://perma.cc/V2WT-KJBA]. 
 58 See generally Spencer Overton, Foreword, Political Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1783 (2013). 
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rights and the judiciary focused on the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts.59 There was virtually no discussion of state courts. 
A key U.S. Supreme Court case will often garner vigorous scholarly 
attention. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder,60 which in essence gutted the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance mechanism under which certain states had to seek federal 
preapproval for any voting changes, has already been the subject of numerous 
articles.61 Similarly, the Court’s decision to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law has 
been the focus of much scholarly commentary.62 None of this scholarship is 
unwarranted or unnecessary, and it is all vital to exploring and understanding 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in elections. But when a state, or a series of 
states, has dealt with the same issues—such as voter ID—academics have 
generally failed to analyze these decisions holistically and comparatively in a 
way that highlights the importance of state judges in shaping the right to 
vote.63 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1928 (2013) (analyzing the impact of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder invalidating Section 4 of the 
Voting Rights Act); Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law Pleading, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1966, 1966 (2013) (considering the effect on election litigation of new procedural rules set 
out in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases); Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and 
Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1847–51 (2013) (analyzing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Anderson–Burdick balancing test for election law cases); Richard L. 
Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1865–66 (2013) (looking at how federal judges thwarted 
Republican-led attempts to change election rules). I was thrilled to participate in the GW 
Law Review symposium, and my comments here are not intended as a criticism of that 
excellent event or the topics discussed by its esteemed contributors. Instead, I am merely 
observing that a holistic analysis of state courts and voting rights has generally not been at 
the forefront of most scholarly consideration of election law. 
 60 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 61 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 715 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination 
Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100 (2013); Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to 
Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 74 (2014). 
 62 See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The History of Voter ID Laws and the Story of 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 453 (Joshua A. 
Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016); Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board: Voter ID, 5–4? If So, So What?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 63, 63 (2008); Justin 
Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION 
L.J. 97, 103–09 (2012); Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting 
Disfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. & 
POL. 329, 329–32 (2009).  
 63 One notable exception is Professor James Gardner’s work considering state 
constitutions and partisan gerrymandering. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and 
the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 
145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 893–900 (1997). In addition, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna 
Shepherd have explored extensively the impact of campaign contributions on state judicial 
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Again, much as there is for the media, there is an obvious and justified 
reason for election law scholars to focus their energy on U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. Scholars are well suited to dissect and analyze jurisprudence that 
applies nationwide. The Court’s opinions are part of our national conversation, 
and election law scholars are vital in shaping that debate—especially when the 
Court may have gone astray. Yet state courts are perhaps more important 
sources of voting rights law because their rulings are based on the explicit 
conferral of the right to vote in state constitutions. Sometimes state judges will 
rule broadly toward voting, but other times state judicial decisions are narrow. 
Understanding these theoretical and normative differences is vital to achieving 
robust protection for the constitutional right to vote. 
III. STATE COURT CASES INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
The right to vote enjoys protection in both the U.S. Constitution and all 
fifty state constitutions, yet the scope of that safeguard is broader in state 
constitutions than in the federal document.64 The U.S. Constitution protects 
the right to vote only implicitly through the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; there is no direct conferral of voting rights.65 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is no federal right to vote 
and that once a state grants the right to vote, it simply must do so on equal 
terms.66 By contrast, virtually every state explicitly confers the right to vote to 
all state citizens in its state constitution.67 State protection for the right to vote 
is therefore more robust than what is provided under federal law.  
Stemming from these state sources of voting rights, state courts decide 
numerous cases that shape the meaning of the constitutional right to vote and 
dictate the rules for an election. This Part discusses some of the most common 
voting rights controversies state courts have adjudicated since 2000, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore68 created a burgeoning field of 
                                                                                                                     
rulings, finding that political parties play a major role in funding judicial campaigns and 
that judges often rule in ways that help the parties who funded them. See Michael S. Kang 
& Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign Finance, 86 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2013) (“Contributions from the Democratic coalition are 
associated with judges voting in a liberal direction across their judicial decisionmaking, 
while contributions from the Republican coalition are associated with judges voting more 
in a conservative direction.”). Professor Shepherd has also found that campaign 
contributions from business interests affect judicial outcomes. See JOANNA SHEPHERD,  
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 8 (June 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VLK3-SA52]. 
 64 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 95–105. 
 65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 66 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 67 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 101. 
 68 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
14 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1 
litigation involving election administration,69 or what one might call “the law 
of voting.”70 Although there are certainly other election-related issues state 
courts hear, this Part focuses on three prevalent categories that demonstrate the 
dichotomy between broad and narrow rulings on the constitutional right to 
vote: voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and the voting process.71  
The goal of this Part is to engage in the inquiry that Part II revealed is 
missing from current election law scholarship: a detailed look at state court 
adjudication of voting rights issues. The analysis shows both that state courts 
are playing a vital role in election law disputes and that judges across states 
often come out differently on how they define the constitutional right to vote. 
State judges either broadly construe state constitutions as going beyond the 
federal constitution or instead narrowly analyze the state protection to be 
merely co-extensive with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings under federal law. 
As the discussion reveals, the broader interpretation is the better mode of 
analysis for protecting voting as a fundamental right that is foundational to our 
concept of democracy. 
A. Voter ID 
The controversy over voter identification laws has been the most salient, 
hot-button issue surrounding the right to vote over the past decade.72 Many 
states have enacted new regulations requiring voters to show some form of 
identification at the polls before voting.73 These laws have been subject to 
                                                                                                                     
 69 As Professor Rick Hasen has recounted, Bush v. Gore demonstrated to scholars that 
the nuts-and-bolts aspects of election administration were worthy of greater attention. See 
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 377–78 (2001). 
 70 See EDWARD B. FOLEY, MICHAEL J. PITTS & JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS, ELECTION LAW 
AND LITIGATION: THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF POLITICS 573 (2014). 
 71 Importantly, I am not attempting to catalog every case state courts have decided 
impacting the right to vote. That kind of inquiry would necessarily be both imprecise 
(because not all state court cases are reported and because there would be considerable 
debate on what kinds of cases impact the right to vote) and less useful than a sustained 
focus on a few areas in which state courts have been particularly active. Thus, the goal is 
not to locate all state voting rights cases but instead to explain, through a representative 
sample, how state court analyses diverge on constitutional interpretation of the right to 
vote. 
That said, I have attempted to uncover all reported state court cases from 2000–2015 
involving voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and the voting process, so long as the court’s 
decision included constitutional analysis on the right to vote. This methodology is 
necessarily under-inclusive, as it contains only cases reported on Westlaw, but it represents 
enough cases—over thirty—to engage in a holistic discussion of how state courts define 
and shape the conferral of voting rights within state constitutions. 
 72 See generally Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 
(2007). 
 73 See Niraj Chokshi, Eight States Have Photo Voter ID Laws Similar to the One 
Struck Down in Wisconsin, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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intense litigation, with some state courts upholding their state’s voter ID law 
and others striking it down. Underlying most decisions sustaining a voter ID 
law is a constricted interpretation of the state-based constitutional right to vote 
that simply follows narrow federal jurisprudence. By contrast, courts that have 
invalidated strict voter ID requirements often give independent, broader force 
to the state constitution’s explicit conferral of the right to vote. 
One reason state courts have been so active in this area is that the U.S. 
Supreme Court already spoke on the issue in its 2008 decision in Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board.74 In that case, the Court rejected a federal 
constitutional challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law, holding that the law, on its 
face, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.75 The three-member plurality opinion narrowly construed the 
federal constitutional protection for voting rights, ruling that the plaintiffs 
could not show that Indiana’s voter ID law amounted to a “substantial” or 
“severe” burden on the right to vote.76 Because the law did not impose a 
“severe” burden, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny review but instead 
employed a lower level balancing test, which is more deferential to a state’s 
role in regulating elections.77 The Court compared the state’s interests with the 
alleged infringement on the right to vote and found that the state interest was 
high and the burden on voters low.78 In essence, the Court closed the door to a 
federal constitutional challenge to voter ID laws unless the voter-plaintiffs 
have very strong evidence of how the law, as applied, severely impedes 
particular people from voting.  
After Crawford, states, likely emboldened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision, began enacting stricter voter ID laws, especially in states with 
conservative-led legislatures.79 Voting rights advocates then turned their 
attention to state courts and state sources of the right to vote, challenging these 
voter ID laws around the country under state constitutions.80 The results have 
                                                                                                                     
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/04/29/eight-states-have-photo-voter-id-laws-similar-to-the-one-struck-
down-in-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/QS8H-DAGM] (noting that thirty-one states had 
some form of a voter ID law). 
 74 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 75 Id. at 202–04. 
 76 See id. at 198, 202–03. 
 77 Id. at 190 (applying Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), and Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). For a criticism of this deferential mode of analysis, 
see Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 
553 (2015) (“Without identifying a specific new rule, the Court has been unjustifiably 
deferring to state laws regarding election administration, thereby giving states tremendous 
power to regulate elections.”). 
 78 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202. 
 79 See Voter Identification Requirements/Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ 
voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/5UBU-FWC7].  
 80 Six of the nine state court decisions involving the constitutionality of a voter ID law 
came after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford. The three that pre-date 
16 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1 
been decidedly mixed. Of the nine state judiciaries to consider the issue 
between 2004 and 2015, six have upheld voter ID laws and three have ruled 
them unconstitutional.81 Of course, not all voter ID laws are the same, as they 
differ regarding the kinds of identification a voter must show and how long 
after an election a voter may bring an ID to the local election officials to 
ensure that the final count includes the voter’s provisional ballot.82 But the 
jurisprudence typically has not turned on the differences between ID 
requirements among the states. Instead, the focus has been on the construction 
of the state’s constitution and an assessment of the severity of the burden the 
laws impose on voters. Put differently, when state courts followed Crawford’s 
narrower interpretation of the right to vote, the courts usually upheld the laws, 
but when courts independently construed the broader grant of voting rights in 
state constitutions, they were more likely to strike down these voting 
restrictions. Notably, the Crawford decision was based on the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, not any state sources of the right to 
vote. It is not binding on a challenge under a different state constitutional 
provision. Nevertheless, many state courts followed Crawford even when 
interpreting their state constitutions, thereby unduly narrowing the scope of the 
constitutional right to vote. 
1. State Courts Upholding Voter ID Laws 
Six state judiciaries (in Colorado, Michigan, Indiana, Georgia, Tennessee, 
and Wisconsin) have upheld voter ID laws in the past decade.  
In 2004, a Colorado trial court rejected a challenge to the state’s voter ID 
law in part because the law was consistent with the new federal requirement, 
                                                                                                                     
Crawford are from Colorado, Missouri, and Michigan. See Colo. Common Cause v. 
Davidson, No. 04CV7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004); In re 
Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 
447 (Mich. 2007); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). 
Even so, the majority of the state court activity on this issue has occurred after Crawford. 
 81 As of early 2016, there was also a case pending in the North Carolina state trial 
court on the validity of the state’s new voter ID law. See Currie v. North Carolina, 
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/CurrieV.NC.php 
[https://perma.cc/7VZV-RZ5E] (last updated July 28, 2015). In 2014, the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma found that a voter had standing to challenge that state’s new voter ID law and 
remanded the case to the trial court. See Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., 319 P.3d 674, 
679 (Okla. 2014). These state court cases are all in addition to the federal court litigation 
that continues over various states’ voter ID laws. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 
493 (5th Cir. 2015); Alan Blinder & Ken Otterbourg, Arguments Over North  
Carolina Voter ID Law Begin in Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/arguments-over-north-carolina-voter-id-law-begin-
in-federal-court.html [https://perma.cc/Z9VB-DC9G]. 
 82 See Justin Levitt, Voter ID Update: The Diversity in the Details, NAT’L  
CONST. CTR. (Oct 30, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/voter-id-update-
the-diversity-in-the-details/ [https://perma.cc/623D-TZS9] (explaining that voter ID laws 
vary and using the example that “some accept student IDs . . . and some do not”). 
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from the Help America Vote Act of 2002, that individuals who mail in their 
voter registration forms must show some form of identification the first time 
they vote.83 The court also found that the state had a sufficient justification for 
the law in its attempt to root out voter fraud, concluding that “all of us must 
show identification for the most mundane of reasons, and I do not believe it 
likely that Plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate that Colorado’s identification 
requirement is a sufficiently ‘severe’ intrusion on the right to vote to trigger 
strict scrutiny.”84 Further, the court explained that the law was not “really an 
identification requirement at all” because the state accepted many forms of 
non-photographic ID, and voters without an ID could cast provisional ballots 
that would count so long as the voter’s name appeared on one of the lists the 
state used to test provisional ballots.85 
Five state supreme courts have also upheld voter ID laws in recent years, 
most often following federal jurisprudence on the right to vote even though the 
state constitutions go further in explicitly conferring voting rights to all state 
citizens.  
The Michigan Supreme Court, ruling 5–2, issued an advisory opinion to 
the legislature saying that the proposed voter ID law was constitutional.86 The 
court invoked both the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution to find that 
the law was a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction designed to preserve 
the purity of elections and to prevent abuses of the electoral franchise.”87 The 
two dissenters vigorously disputed this notion, contending that although 
“preventing voter fraud is an important interest in the abstract, . . . the relevant 
inquiry is whether, and to what degree, in-person voter fraud would be 
addressed by the photo identification requirement.”88 The dissenters found that 
the law would not root out any existing fraud in Michigan elections, while at 
the same time it would infringe the fundamental right to vote.89 
The Indiana Supreme Court approved its state’s voter ID law by a 4–1 
vote under the state constitution, holding that the meaning of the direct 
conferral of voting rights under Indiana’s Constitution is the same, or in 
lockstep with, the U.S. Constitution.90 The court therefore followed the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s lead from its Crawford decision in upholding the law under 
Indiana’s Constitution, instead of giving its state constitution the independent 
and broader force that the explicit grant of the right to vote should warrant.91 
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 84 Id. at *12. 
 85 Id. at *13. 
 86 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 
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 87 Id. at 448. 
 88 Id. at 474–77 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 89 Id.; see also id. at 487 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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The Georgia Supreme Court, by contrast, purported to give independent 
meaning to its state constitution’s provision on voting rights, but it still upheld 
the voter ID law by a 6–1 vote.92 The court held that the state constitution 
authorized the legislature to enact the law as a “reasonable procedure for 
verifying that the individual appearing to vote in person is actually the same 
person who registered to vote.”93 The dissent lamented the fact that the 
Georgia voter ID law “has further constricted a citizen’s ability to cast a 
regular ballot at his or her polling precinct.”94  
The Tennessee Supreme Court was unanimous in its voter ID ruling, 
rejecting a state constitutional challenge to the law.95 The court followed a 
“number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court, [which] have 
rejected the notion that a state must present evidence that it has been afflicted 
by voter fraud in order to enact laws pursuant to its authority to protect the 
integrity of the election process.”96 Although the court claimed to be applying 
strict scrutiny review, and thus purportedly was not just following Crawford 
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretative method for the right to vote, it still 
held that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s goals of securing 
election integrity.97 This legal analysis—if genuine about using strict 
scrutiny—at least could leave the door open to broader rulings on the state 
constitutional right to vote; litigants simply need better evidence of the kinds 
of burdens voting restrictions actually impose on voters to prevail under 
heightened scrutiny. 
Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued two opinions, one 5–2 and 
the other 4–3, upholding the state’s voter ID law, expressly following both the 
U.S. Supreme Court and these prior state court decisions.98 Initially, two 
Wisconsin trial courts construed the state’s constitution as exceeding the 
federal counterpart in conferring the right to vote, holding that the state’s voter 
ID law imposed an impermissible qualification for voting under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.99 One court explicitly distinguished Crawford by noting, “this 
case is founded upon the Wisconsin Constitution which expressly guarantees 
the right to vote while Crawford was based upon the U.S. Constitution which 
offers no such guarantee.”100 The Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually 
reversed these courts and upheld the state’s voter ID requirement, following 
                                                                                                                     
 92 Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Ga. 2011). 
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 94 Id. at 76 (Benham, J., dissenting). 
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 96 Id. at 104. 
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2012 WL 763586, at *8 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP 
v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553, at *10 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012) 
(granting motion for temporary injunction). 
 100 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 2012 WL 739553, at *9. 
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federal jurisprudence to answer the state constitutional question and conclude 
that the law did not add an additional qualification to vote and did not impose 
an undue burden on voting.101 In the 5–2 decision, the court found that the 
voter ID provision did not add an additional qualification to vote beyond what 
the state constitution allows; in the 4–3 decision, the majority found that the 
voter ID requirement was not overly burdensome.102  
2. State Courts Invalidating Voter ID Laws 
Within the past few years, courts in three states (Missouri, Pennsylvania, 
and Arkansas) have invalidated voter ID laws under state constitutions, 
recognizing that the state constitutional protection for the right to vote goes 
beyond the federal constitution. These courts have therefore broadly construed 
their state constitutions’ explicit conferral of voting rights. 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in 2006, was the first state court to strike 
down a voter ID law.103 The court held that the law violated the Missouri 
Constitution’s equal protection clause and right-to-vote provision and did not 
                                                                                                                     
 101 League of Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 305; Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 
851 N.W.2d at 265. 
 102 League of Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 305; Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 
851 N.W.2d at 265. Justice Crooks joined the majority in League of Women Voters, the  
5–2 decision, but joined the dissent in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, the 4–3 ruling. He 
wrote separately in League of Women Voters to explain that his decision in that case rested 
largely on the fact that the plaintiffs brought only a facial challenge to the law. League of 
Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 316 (Crooks, J., concurring). He dissented in Milwaukee 
Branch of the NAACP, however, finding that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence 
of specific burdens the law imposed on voters. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 851 
N.W.2d at 282–85 (Crooks, J. dissenting). 
Federal courts have also upheld the Wisconsin law. Initially, a trial court ruled that the 
law was invalid under both Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842, 863 
(E.D. Wis. 2014). The Seventh Circuit reversed that decision shortly before the 2014 
election. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit then 
refused to hear the case en banc, over the dissent of five judges, including Judge Richard 
Posner (who had previously voted to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law in the Crawford case). 
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The U.S. Supreme Court 
stayed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, so Wisconsin was not allowed to implement its voter 
ID law for the 2014 election. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2014). The Supreme Court 
later denied certiorari, Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551, 1551 (2015), meaning that the 
federal judiciary ultimately upheld Wisconsin’s voter ID law, allowing the state to put it 
into place for the 2016 election. 
 103 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). In 1999, a 
Virginia trial court issued an injunction against the state from moving forward with a “pilot 
program” in which it would require voters to show identification in ten jurisdictions. 
Democratic Party of Va. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. HK-1788, 1999 WL 1318834, at *2 
(Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1999). Although the court noted that the pilot program raised 
significant issues regarding the constitutional right to vote, it did not actually rule on the 
constitutionality of the voter ID law. Id. 
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satisfy strict scrutiny.104 More specifically, the court found that although 
combating voter fraud was a compelling state interest, the voter ID law was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.105 In conducting its analysis, the 
court took pains to explain that the Missouri Constitution gives broad 
protection to voting as a fundamental right, thus focusing on the state source of 
the right to vote as independent from the federal constitution.106 
The fate of the voter ID requirement in Pennsylvania took a circuitous 
route—with a state trial judge initially upholding the law,107 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court vacating that decision,108 and then the trial court putting the 
law on hold for the upcoming election109—before a different trial judge finally 
struck down the law under the state constitution.110 Underlying the 
Pennsylvania trial court’s final decision invalidating the law was the notion 
that  
As a constitutional prerequisite, any voter ID law must contain a mechanism 
for ensuring liberal access to compliant photo IDs so that the requirement of 
photo ID does not disenfranchise valid voters. In other words, a state cannot 
require (A) proof of identification, (photo ID), without also mandating (B), 
the government provide the new proof of identification.111 
The court thus found that the voter ID law violated the state constitution’s 
conferral of the “fundamental right to vote.”112 It gave primacy to the notion 
that all voters should have easy access to the ballot without significant 
hindrance from state-imposed voter restrictions. The Governor announced that 
he would not appeal this decision, meaning that the opponents of voter ID 
ultimately prevailed, through state courts and under the state constitution, in 
eliminating Pennsylvania’s strict voter ID requirement.113 
Finally, an Arkansas trial court construed its state constitution as going 
beyond the federal constitution, ruling that the state’s voter ID law imposed an 
additional “qualification” to vote beyond what the Arkansas Constitution 
                                                                                                                     
 104 Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 204. 
 105 Id. at 204–05. 
 106 See id. at 211 (“The express constitutional protection of the right to vote 
differentiates the Missouri constitution from its federal counterpart.”). 
 107 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *32 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam). 
 108 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5–6 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam). 
 109 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012). 
 110 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *27 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014). 
 111 Id. at *18. 
 112 Id. at *24. 
 113 See Dave Warner, Pennsylvania Governor Drops Court Fight for Voter ID Law, 
REUTERS (May 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/us-usa-voterid-
pennsylvania-idUSBREA4800N20140509 [https://perma.cc/XE6D-ZZ59]. 
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permits.114 The Arkansas Supreme Court, in affirming, also recognized the 
primacy and independence of the state constitution’s conferral of voting 
rights.115 The court found that the four voter qualifications listed in the 
Arkansas Constitution (U.S. citizenship, Arkansas resident, over 18, and 
lawfully registered) “simply do not include any proof-of-identity 
requirement.”116 The court also rejected reliance on Crawford or cases from 
other jurisdictions by explaining that “those courts interpreted the United 
States Constitution or their respective states’ constitutions, and here, we 
address the present issue solely under the Arkansas Constitution”117—even 
though the language of the Arkansas Constitution is not materially different 
from that of other states. The court’s analysis exemplifies a broader 
interpretation of the constitutional right to vote under the state constitution.  
This analysis does not mean that all voter ID laws are inherently suspect 
under state constitutions. The question is whether an ID law is so restrictive 
that it adds, in essence, an additional “qualification” for voting that not all 
citizens can satisfy easily. Many states have failed to ensure universal 
possession of qualifying IDs or otherwise provided alternatives to those who 
do not have them. In these states, the voter ID law is tantamount to an 
additional qualification that precludes some people from voting. As the 
Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Arkansas cases show, a broad construction of 
state constitutional language conferring the right to vote leads to the 
invalidation of these stricter ID requirements. 
In sum, since 2004, state courts in nine states have rendered important 
decisions regarding voter identification. Courts that have interpreted their state 
constitutions to be in “lockstep,” or co-extensive, with the federal constitution, 
or that otherwise followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s Crawford decision, 
upheld the laws. Their analysis exemplifies an unduly narrow view of the 
explicit conferral of voting rights in state constitutions. By contrast, courts that 
properly understood the state constitutional right to vote broadly as going 
beyond federal protection invalidated the voting restrictions.118  
B. Felon Disenfranchisement 
State courts have also been significant in the debate over felon 
disenfranchisement, with some courts broadly construing the right to vote for 
                                                                                                                     
 114 See Andrew DeMillo, AP, Group Asks Judge to Halt Arkansas Voter-ID Law,  
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (June 24, 2014), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/ 
jun/24/group-asks-judge-halt-arkansas-voter-id-law/ [https://perma.cc/9ARN-TBN5]. The 
judge had issued a prior decision invalidating the law, but the state supreme court reversed 
that decision on procedural grounds. See Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. Pulaski 
Cty. Election Comm’n, 437 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Ark. 2014). 
 115 Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Ark. 2014). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 853. 
 118 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 105–19. 
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felons and thereby limiting the reach of laws that disenfranchise them, and 
other courts ruling more narrowly on the voting rights issue to uphold the 
restrictions. The U.S. Supreme Court last considered the topic in 1985,119 but 
several federal appellate courts have issued rulings recently on felon 
disenfranchisement, rejecting challenges to state laws under the federal Voting 
Rights Act or the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.120 But plaintiffs 
have prevailed in some state courts, particularly when they have convinced 
state judges to construe the right to vote broadly and thus limit the reach of 
felon disenfranchisement laws. These cases provide another example of how a 
robust state court analysis of the right to vote can overcome undue voting 
restrictions, thereby including more people in the electorate.  
For instance, a California appellate court ruled that the California 
Constitution’s delegation to the legislature to “provide for the disqualification 
of electors while . . . imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony”121 
did not apply to those prisoners “incarcerated in a local detention facility for 
the conviction of a felony, including persons serving that term as a condition 
of probation.”122 As part of its ruling, the court applied a canon of construction 
in favor of broader voting rights, stating, 
[i]n the absence of any clear intent by the Legislature or the voters, we apply 
the principle that “[t]he exercise of the franchise is one of the most important 
functions of good citizenship, and no construction of an election law should 
be indulged that would disenfranchise any voter if the law is reasonably 
susceptible of any other meaning.”123 
                                                                                                                     
 119 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating Alabama felon 
disenfranchisement law because it was passed with racial animus); see also Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding California felon disenfranchisement law under 
the Reduction in Representation Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 120 See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (rejecting challenge to felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); 
Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a provision of the 
Mississippi Constitution that prohibits felons from voting does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 154 (2d 
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 
2009) (rejecting challenge to felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act); 
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of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same). Notably, many of these 
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plaintiffs have not yet prevailed in federal court, the proper resolution of the issue is far 
from clear. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F.3d at 343 (Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 367 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 121 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 122 League of Women Voters of Cal. v. McPherson, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 588 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 123 Id. at 594 (quoting Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417–18 (Cal. 1966)). 
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Other courts also have limited the reach of a state’s felon 
disenfranchisement law by invoking a broader analysis of state voting rights. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, invalidated the state’s decision to 
disenfranchise an individual who was convicted of homicide when the state 
had not listed homicide as an “infamous crime” at the time he committed the 
offense.124 The court explained that “[o]ur Constitution guarantees its citizenry 
the right to vote pursuant to article I, section 5, protecting all except those 
convicted of infamous crimes. That the entitlement is preserved in the 
Constitution rather than by legislative enactment underscores its importance to 
the people.”125 Essential to the court’s analysis was the principle that the right 
to vote is fundamental and robust, even for felons, and therefore that the 
legislature may take that right away only pursuant to constitutional authority. 
Disenfranchising the defendant based on a conviction for a crime that was not 
“infamous” constituted a view of voting rights that was too narrow, leading to 
an impermissible “restraint on liberty.”126  
The Iowa Supreme Court also limited the reach of its state’s felon 
disenfranchisement law by finding that an aggravated misdemeanor offense of 
“operating while intoxicated” was not an “infamous crime” under the state 
constitution.127 The plurality opinion held that a crime is “infamous” only if it 
is one “that reveals that voters who commit the crime would tend to undermine 
the process of democratic governance through elections.”128 The court thereby 
narrowed the state’s disenfranchisement provision and, in the process, 
emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote.129  
But plaintiffs challenging felon disenfranchisement laws have not seen 
universal success in state courts, especially when the courts fail to construe 
voting rights broadly. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, held that the 
state was justified in disenfranchising, during the time of his incarceration, an 
individual convicted of misdemeanor battery pursuant to the legislature’s 
general police power to deprive convicted prisoners of the right to vote while 
they are in jail.130 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that to 
regain voting rights, a felon who had served his or her full prison sentence still 
                                                                                                                     
 124 May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 345–48 (Tenn. 2008). 
 125 Id. at 346 (footnote omitted). 
 126 Id. at 345–47. The Tennessee Supreme Court also construed its state constitution’s 
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Id. at 846. 
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must repay the entire amount of his or her “legal financial obligations.”131 The 
court employed a lockstep132 analysis—in which it simply followed the U.S. 
Constitution and federal jurisprudence on the issue—to conclude that the 
Washington Constitution “does not provide greater protection of voting rights 
for felons than does the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.”133 
Ultimately, the majority held that the right to vote is not a fundamental right 
for felons.134  
Given that many state constitutions have sanctioned felon 
disenfranchisement for years,135 there is often no plausible state-based legal 
argument against the laws. Nevertheless, a narrower view of the constitutional 
right to vote helps states in their attempt to justify and even expand their felon 
disenfranchisement provisions. A broader interpretation of the right to vote 
under state constitutions, by contrast, leads state courts to cabin the reach of 
these laws. 
C. Voting Process 
State judges routinely regulate the rules of the voting process, rendering 
decisions on a wide range of issues such as the kinds of machines voters use 
and the procedures for accepting absentee ballots. When things go awry on 
Election Day, state judges decide whether to extend polling hours. Through 
these opinions, which all involve Election Day or post-election mechanics, 
state courts play a vital role in dictating the meaning and scope of the 
constitutional right to vote. Sometimes the decisions broadly construe the right 
to vote and open up the process to more people, while other times the opinions 
are narrow and ultimately make voting harder.  
                                                                                                                     
 131 Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 761 (Wash. 2007). 
 132 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining the lockstep approach). 
 133 Madison, 163 P.3d at 766. 
 134 Id. at 768. In a subsequent decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that the 
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1. Voting Machines 
In recent years, state courts around the country have issued opinions on the 
constitutionality of new electronic voting machines. Although most state 
judges have rejected these challenges and elevated the role of states in 
regulating the election process, at least one state court emphasized the 
importance of the constitutional right to vote and suggested that the problems 
that might arise with these new machines could potentially infringe that right.  
After the 2000 presidential election debacle in Florida, Congress enacted 
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which provided funds to states and 
localities to replace outdated voting equipment.136 Many states purchased new 
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), or touch-screen, voting machines. Some 
voters then challenged the use of these machines as infringing on their rights, 
alleging that the machines prevented some people from casting an effective 
vote or having their ballot count. Plaintiffs initially challenged the DRE 
machines in federal court, arguing that they violated equal protection by 
treating voters who use them differently from voters who use paper ballots.137 
But after the federal courts rejected these claims, plaintiffs turned to state 
courts. 
The Georgia Supreme Court, in rejecting a challenge to Georgia’s DRE 
machines, narrowly construed the Georgia Constitution’s right-to-vote 
provision to go only as far as federal jurisprudence.138 The plaintiffs argued 
that the state’s use of electronic voting machines, instead of paper ballots, 
violated their fundamental right to vote because the state was not protecting 
the DRE machines from fraudulent manipulation through the use of an 
independent audit trail or county and state tabulators.139 The court, following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to vote, found that the 
DRE machines did not burden voters and therefore did not require strict 
scrutiny review, the highest form of judicial inquiry.140 By employing a lower 
level of scrutiny, the court deferred to the state’s assertion of its “important 
regulatory interests” in implementing the law.141 Implicit in this analysis is a 
narrower construction of the state-based constitutional right to vote in favor of 
state regulation of the voting process. 
The Texas Supreme Court, aligning with the Georgia case and federal 
court opinions, also rejected a challenge to DRE machines.142 The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
 136 Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 
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alleged that the use of the DRE machines violated the state constitution’s grant 
of the right to vote.143 Specifically, they argued that paper ballots are less 
subject to fraud or manipulation than electronic machines, and that voters who 
use the electronic machines are denied the right to a hand recount of votes if a 
recount is necessary, thereby devaluing the votes of those who use the DRE 
technology.144 The court rejected these arguments, holding that the DRE 
machines did not “impose severe restrictions on voters, particularly in light of 
the significant benefits such machines offer.”145 Part of that analysis included 
a limiting construction of the state constitution’s conferral of voting rights to 
all citizens. 
But an Arizona appellate court took a different tact, elevating the 
importance of the constitutional right to vote in analyzing this question.146 
Various plaintiffs with disabilities challenged Arizona’s new DRE machines, 
alleging that they were inaccurate, inaccessible for voters with disabilities, and 
subject to vote manipulation.147 An appellate court reversed a trial court 
decision that had dismissed the lawsuit, stating that the plaintiffs had presented 
sufficient evidence that the machines might violate both the state constitution 
and state statutes to allow the suit to move forward.148 The court concluded 
that “Arizona’s constitutional right to a ‘free and equal’ election is implicated 
when votes are not properly counted,” and that there was a risk that the new 
DRE machines might not correctly record and tabulate the votes.149 
In sum, most state courts have rejected challenges to DRE machines and 
narrowly construed their state constitutions in the process, but the Arizona 
court is an exception. That court’s analysis demonstrates how questions 
involving the efficacy of the vote casting and counting process can implicate 
the broader grant of the right to vote within state constitutions. 
2. Extending Polling Hours on Election Day 
On Election Day itself, state courts are often involved in decisions 
regarding whether to extend the polling hours because of some issue or 
malfunction. Lengthening the polling time in the event of a problem obviously 
makes it easier for some people to vote; strictly following the closing deadline 
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might, in some circumstances, unduly shut people out of the democratic 
process, thereby infringing on their constitutional right to vote. Further, 
appellate courts that reverse a trial court decision to extend polling hours 
inherently interfere with the trial judge’s broader, on-the-ground determination 
of how best to effectuate the constitutional right to vote for all citizens.  
During the 2000 presidential election dispute, the decisions of the Florida 
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore grabbed all of the 
headlines, but a ruling from a Missouri appellate court was also significant. 
The Gore campaign had successfully obtained an order from a Missouri trial 
judge to extend the polling hours in some St. Louis precincts until 10:00 p.m., 
three hours after the statutory closing time, due to extremely long lines 
throughout the day that were preventing some people from voting.150 The 
Bush campaign convinced an appellate court to reverse that ruling.151 As part 
of its written order issued a month later, the court of appeals explained the 
dilemma facing state trial judges on Election Day: 
We recognize that in the heat of a closely-contested election campaign, trial 
judges may be called upon to make difficult decisions with little time for 
deliberation. Where fundamental rights are at stake, such pressures are 
magnified. But commendable zeal to protect voting rights must be tempered 
by the corresponding duty to protect the integrity of the voting process. 
Courts should not hesitate to vigorously enforce the election laws so that 
every properly registered voter has the opportunity to vote. But equal 
vigilance is required to ensure that only those entitled to vote are allowed to 
cast a ballot. Otherwise, the rights of those lawfully entitled to vote are 
inevitably diluted.152 
A similar issue arose during the 2002 election in Arkansas, with the 
Democratic Party obtaining an emergency order from a trial court judge to 
extend the polling hours from 7:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. in one Arkansas county, 
only later to have the Arkansas Supreme Court reverse that decision.153 The 
judge issued the order extending polling hours because the county did not have 
sufficient voting booths, voting rolls, or other supplies and equipment, with 
ballots being depleted during the day at three precincts.154 These deficiencies 
had the tangible effect of taking away the right to vote for some people. But 
the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the order later that evening, ruling that 
the Arkansas election law requiring polls to close at 7:30 p.m. was clear and 
mandatory.155 The decision was initially 6–0 with one justice not participating, 
but two days later the court issued a 4–3 per curiam decision with one 
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 154 Id. at 798–99. 
 155 Id. at 800 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-304 (Repl. 2000)). 
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concurrence and three dissenting opinions.156 The dissenters argued that the 
court did not have proper appellate jurisdiction over the case and therefore that 
the court should not have interfered with the trial judge’s decision.157 
Judges throughout the country regularly extend polling hours in extreme 
circumstances without facing reversal from appellate courts. In 2014, a 
Connecticut judge ordered two voting locations in Hartford to remain open for 
an additional half hour because, earlier in the day, those precincts were 
missing voter registration information.158 In 2010, a New Hampshire judge 
extended the polling time by one hour because there had been a shooting in the 
town, which had resulted in a lockdown of a local school that the town was 
using as a polling place.159 Similarly, a Maryland judge extended the polling 
hours in 2006 in Montgomery County due to a glitch in the county’s electronic 
voting machines.160 Two years later, a Maryland judge extended the polling 
time by ninety minutes due to a severe ice storm.161 During the 1990 election, 
a North Carolina judge lengthened the voting time by one hour due to long 
lines throughout the day.162 These are just a few examples; in every election 
cycle there are news reports of state judges lengthening polling hours to 
respond to some problem with the voting process.163 These last-minute 
decisions to extend voting hours do not always result in published written 
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Id. at 803 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Another justice who initially voted to reverse but then 
dissented from the written opinion wrote that on Election Day he had “acted improvidently 
in this matter” and that he was “truly embarrassed.” Id. at 804 (Corbin, J., dissenting). 
 158 See Polls Close Across Connecticut, NBC CONN. (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Voters-Report-Problems-at-Polls-281425521.html 
[https://perma.cc/XF9N-WYTX].  
 159 Press Release, N.H. Att’y Gen., Town of Pittsburg Polling Places to Stay Open to 
8:00 PM (Nov. 4, 2010) (available through the Federal News Service). 
 160 Debbi Wilgoren, Montgomery to Extend Voting Hours After Election Glitches, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/ 
technology/2006/09/12/montgomery-to-extend-voting-hours-after-election-glitches/5a0a55c0 
-7a52-4212-a9c3-44610150443b/ [https://perma.cc/P6P8-DHH3]. 
 161 Eric M. Weiss & Joshua Zumbrun, Icy Rain Ties Up Traffic, Causes Dangerous 
Ride to the Polls, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/02/12/ST2008021202302.html [https://perma.cc/H4WM-X2YW]. 
 162 See Democratic Party of Guilford Cty. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 467 
S.E.2d 681, 682–83 (N.C. 1996). 
 163 See, e.g., Christine Hauser & John Holusha, Problems Lead 8 States to Extend 
Some Voting Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/08/ 
world/americas/08iht-web.1108day.3441243.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2CKX-
WFVX]. 
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opinions or national media coverage, yet they impact meaningfully the 
conduct of the election and thus the constitutional right to vote.164  
Broadly construing voting rights does not mean that judges should always 
extend polling hours; plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that there is a 
significant problem that will actually impede some people from voting without 
the additional time. As these examples demonstrate, state trial judges, when 
faced with an Election Day problem, often broadly interpret the right to vote 
so as to ensure that everyone has a reasonable chance to exercise that right on 
Election Day.165 
3. Complying with Rules for Casting a Ballot 
The rules for casting ballots are also fodder for state court involvement in 
the voting process, especially in an election contest when the determination of 
who won may come down to those votes.166 Once again, a state judge’s 
construction of the constitutional right to vote as either broad or narrow often 
determines whether many individuals are able to participate in our democracy.  
In perhaps the most well-known example, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
resolved the 2008 U.S. Senate election over seven months after Election Day 
by ruling that absentee voters must “strictly” comply with the statutory 
requirements for voting via absentee ballot.167 The court refused to adopt a 
more lenient “substantial compliance” standard instead.168 The ruling, which 
certified Democrat Al Franken as the winner, was narrow with respect to 
voting rights because it meant that some voters did not have their votes count 
if they had not complied with the precise rules for casting absentee ballots.169 
                                                                                                                     
 164 Federal courts, too, have issued rulings extending polling hours on Election Day. 
See, e.g., Amended Order, Obama for Am. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:08-
CV-00562 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2008). Nevertheless, a search of judicial opinions and news 
reports reveals much more state court than federal court activity on this issue. See generally 
Robert C. O’Brien et al., Election Day Challenges to Polling Hours and the Judiciary’s 
Cautious Response, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2009) (citing mostly state court cases and 
news articles involving state judges extending polling hours). 
 165 A state court decision regarding the extension of polling hours was the subject of an 
academic simulation of a hypothetical election contest in 2008 between John McCain and 
Barack Obama to test the mechanisms for resolving a post-election dispute over the 
presidency. See Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal for 
Disputed Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 472–74 (2010). 
 166 For an overview of the procedures for resolving post-election disputes in all fifty 
states, see Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1 
(2013). 
 167 Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam). 
 168 Id. 
 169 See id. For a discussion of the Minnesota recount and court rulings, see Edward B. 
Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 129 (2011). Professor Justin Levitt has noted that, even though the 
Minnesota Supreme Court rested on a “strict compliance” standard for absentee voters, the 
application of that standard was actually more lenient. See Justin Levitt, Resolving Election 
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In a similar holding that commanded strict compliance with voting rules, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the requirement that nondisabled 
absentee voters hand deliver their ballots themselves was “mandatory.”170 The 
court employed this strict reading of state law in spite of the fact that the 
Allegheny County Board of Elections had issued a declaration before the 
election sanctioning the long-standing practice of allowing third parties to 
deliver others’ absentee ballots.171 The court held that “so-called technicalities 
of the Election Code are necessary for the preservation of secrecy and the 
sanctity of the ballot and must therefore be observed—particularly where, as 
here, they are designed to reduce fraud.”172 This narrow ruling on the 
constitutional right to vote meant that fifty-six voters who had complied with 
the election officials’ stated rules for casting absentee ballots were 
disenfranchised, potentially affecting the outcome of at least one race.173  
The Alabama Supreme Court also required voters to comply strictly with 
the rules for absentee balloting, refusing to allow voters to cure the defects 
after Election Day in an election contest.174 The court held that “to count the 
votes of voters who fail to comply with the essential requirement of submitting 
proper identification with their absentee ballots would have the effect of 
disenfranchising qualified electors who choose not to vote rather than to make 
the effort to comply with the absentee-voting requirements.”175 These cases 
demonstrate the manner in which state courts have issued opinions narrowly 
construing the right to vote, either on constitutional or statutory grounds, 
thereby constricting who is able to participate in the election. 
By contrast, a Tennessee appellate court broadly interpreted a Tennessee 
statute regulating how much time a voter may spend in the voting booth so as 
to effectuate an individual’s constitutional right to vote.176 The statute at issue 
limited a voter to five minutes in the voting booth if other voters were waiting 
and otherwise to a maximum of ten minutes.177 The evidence showed that, 
because of a lengthy ballot and some precincts using new machines, there 
were long lines on Election Day.178 Almost half of all voters took longer than 
five minutes to vote, while five percent took longer than ten minutes.179 The 
                                                                                                                     
Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 127–28 
(2012). Nevertheless, the court’s ruling itself was narrow with respect to the counting of 
ballots because the court explicitly adopted the “strict compliance” standard. See id. 
 170 In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 
1234 (Pa. 2004). 
 171 Id. at 1226–27. 
 172 Id. at 1234. 
 173 Id. at 1225. 
 174 Townson v. Stonicher, 933 So. 2d 1062, 1065–66 (Ala. 2005). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Stuart v. Anderson Cty. Election Comm’n, 300 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 177 Id. at 689 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-118 (Supp. 2008)). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id.  
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court rejected the losing candidate’s argument that this evidence demonstrated 
that illegal votes tainted the election, noting that the voters’ failure to comply 
with the time limit was not a “serious” violation of the statute.180 Quoting the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, the court explained, “[T]echnical non-conformity 
with election statutes will not necessarily void an election, as ‘such strictness 
would lead to defeat rather than uphold, popular election, and can not be 
maintained.’”181 The court also rejected the losing candidate’s second 
argument that the election officials’ failure to follow precisely a Tennessee 
election statute requiring voters to show “other evidence of identification” 
made these votes “illegal.”182 The parties stipulated that everyone who had 
voted was properly registered to do so, meaning that the failure to ask for 
“other evidence of identification” did not have any practical effect, even 
though it was technically a violation of the statute.183 Thus, the decision 
placed paramount importance on an individual’s constitutional right to vote 
rather than mandating strict compliance with the election statutes. But it 
contrasts with the opinions discussed above that required strict compliance 
with election rules, even if that meant the disenfranchisement of some voters.  
 * * * 
This Part has discussed over thirty state court cases, issued within the last 
decade, that have impacted elections and the constitutional right to vote. But it 
focused on only three issues: voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and rules 
about the voting process. This analysis barely scratches the surface of election-
related decisions state courts render every year. State judges issue opinions on 
a wide range of election law topics, such as voter registration,184 
redistricting,185 ballot access,186 and campaign finance,187 to name just a few 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Id. at 690 (quoting King v. Sevier Cty. Election Comm’n, 282 S.W.3d 37 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2008)). 
 181 Id. at 689 (alteration in original) (quoting Forbes v. Bell, 816 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. 
1991)). 
 182 Stuart, 300 S.W.3d at 690. 
 183 Id. at 691. 
 184 See Guare v. State, 117 A.3d 731 (N.H. 2015) (per curiam) (invalidating new 
language on voter registration form that conflated domicile and residency). 
 185 See, e.g., In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 80 A.3d 1073 (Md. 2013) (holding that 
the new redistricting plan did not violate the state constitution, federal constitution, or 
Voting Rights Act); Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66 (N.M. 2012) (holding that the lower 
court erred in adopting the particular redistricting plan for the state legislature).  
 186 See, e.g., Nader for President 2004 v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 926 A.2d 199 
(Md. 2007) (broadly construing state ballot access rules under the state constitution to 
allow ballot access); Walsh v. Katz, 953 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 2011) (strictly construing ballot 
access rules and thereby denying ballot access to candidate).  
 187 See, e.g., Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, 269 P.3d 1248 (Colo. 2012) 
(interpreting campaign finance provision of Colorado Constitution); State v. Green 
Mountain Future, 86 A.3d 981 (Vt. 2013) (upholding disclosure requirements for political 
action committees). 
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examples. Just as with cases involving the right to vote, the analysis often 
differs between states, with some courts issuing broad opinions and other 
courts more narrowly construing the rules for participating in our democracy. 
Most of these cases receive little media attention or public scrutiny, even 
when the states’ highest courts issue the opinions, and yet they play a 
significant role in how elections operate. On a theoretical level, the cases are 
inherently important because they define the scope of the right to vote, which 
ultimately comes from state constitutions. Practically, the decisions quite 
literally alter the electorate, and therefore, the election.  
Understanding how different judges define the meaning of democratic 
participation, either broadly or narrowly, will give us better tools for 
protecting the right to vote as robustly as possible. Litigants can use the 
comparative analysis to influence courts by showing how some judges have 
properly given independent meaning to their state constitutions and thereby 
broadly construed the individual right to vote, while other judges have gone 
astray in following a narrower federal interpretation. That is, a comparative 
analysis of the overall approach to the constitutional right to vote can assist 
litigants in arguing for broader protection under a state’s constitution. 
The scholarly and advocacy community can also go a step further. We 
should include, as part of the ongoing conversation regarding the kinds of 
judges we want deciding these cases, evidence of how state judges impact the 
constitutional right to vote. Do we want judges who will narrowly construe 
voting rights while elevating the role of states in regulating elections? Or do 
we want judges who will apply a legal canon that is broader and more 
inclusive in how it evaluates the constitutional right to vote? The next Part 
contributes to that conversation by examining some features of judicial 
ideology and judicial selection that might correlate with these approaches. 
IV. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY, JUDICIAL SELECTION, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
As the previous Part highlighted, in every election cycle state courts are 
intimately involved in construing the scope and meaning of the constitutional 
right to vote. Our attention to these cases, as well as the selection process for 
the judges who decide them, should be correspondingly robust. 
Beyond simply understanding the cases themselves, we can use them to 
contribute to the already-robust debate over who we choose to be our state 
judges and how we select them.188 This Part first offers some initial thoughts 
on how judicial ideology might affect a judge’s rulings on voting rights issues. 
                                                                                                                     
 188 There are scores of law review articles considering the merits of electing versus 
appointing state judges. For a small sample of that debate, see, for example, Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Unconstitutionality of Electing State Judges, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 
(2013); F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate 
of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 
(1999); Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077 
(2007).  
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It then provides some preliminary analysis on how the method of judicial 
selection correlates, at least for certain issues, with a judge’s views on the 
constitutional right to vote. None of the findings are definitive, as they are 
based on simple observations and not quantitative empirical analysis. But they 
still provide preliminary, anecdotal data that can supplement the existing 
scholarly debate on these issues. 
A. Judicial Ideology and the Right to Vote 
Liberal judges tend to view individual rights broadly, granting fuller 
protection to plaintiffs asserting these rights against state regulation, while 
conservative judges usually analyze them more narrowly. Of course, ideology 
is not the only driver of judicial decision-making, as legal analysis is based on 
law, precedent, and the facts of a particular case.189 That said, ideology often 
correlates with the outcome in a case, especially on highly partisan issues such 
as election law and voting rights.190 It should come as no surprise, then, that a 
judge’s analysis of the constitutional right to vote often correlates with his or 
her ideology.191  
The link between ideology and interpretation of the constitutional right to 
vote is most poignant in decisions on voter ID laws.192 Most (although not all) 
of the state judges ruling on voter ID laws in the past decade have followed 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Partisanship Suppressed: Judicial Decision-Making in 
Ralph Nader’s 2004 Ballot Access Litigation, 7 ELECTION L.J. 301, 302 (2008) (finding 
that “partisanship did not have a systematic effect on judicial behavior in Nader’s 2004 
ballot access litigation”). 
 190 See, e.g., Kyle Casimir Kopko, The Effect of Partisanship in Election Law Judicial 
Decision-Making, at iii (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University), 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?217393141997567::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:71773 [https:// 
perma.cc/T9UA-3AFZ] (finding a relationship between the ideology of federal judges and 
their rulings on campaign finance cases, and a “conditional partisanship” effect in 
redistricting cases depending on the composition of the three-judge court hearing the 
dispute). 
 191 Prior empirical studies have shown that liberal and conservative judges rule 
differently on various election law issues. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas 
Miles have found that ideology, based on the partisanship of the appointing President, 
correlates strongly with how a federal judge rules in a Voting Rights Act case. See Adam 
B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19–25 
(2008). Similarly, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd have found that state 
judges’ rulings are often consistent with the views of the political parties that funded their 
election campaigns. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 1243–44. 
 192 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New 
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 
647 (2008) (considering both federal and state voter ID decisions and finding that, as of 
2008, “there have been fourteen votes by Democratic judges against the constitutionality of 
photo-ID requirements, and only three votes indicating that the requirement at issue is 
permissible. For Republican judges, the respective numbers are three (against 
constitutionality) and fifteen (for constitutionality).” (footnote omitted)). 
34 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:1 
their ideological predilections. Liberal judges most often construe the 
constitutional right to vote broadly and therefore view voter ID laws 
skeptically, while conservative judges tend to do the opposite.193 
Most of the Missouri Supreme Court judges194 in the 6–1 majority that 
invalidated the state’s voter ID law had liberal backgrounds.195 Democratic 
                                                                                                                     
 193 See Hasen, supra note 27, at 106. An important caveat is required here: I am not 
attempting a quantitative empirical analysis, and the sample size is relatively small, so the 
conclusions are necessarily tentative. Also, the direction of influence is unclear: does 
ideology affect the decision, or is the decision simply evidence of the judge’s ideology? 
But the analysis at least provides a first step in showing that the political identity of the 
judges may matter when deciding a voting rights controversy. 
 194 Under the Missouri Constitution, only the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme 
Court is referred to as a “Justice.” The other members of the Court are referred to as 
“Judges.” See MO. CONST. art V, §§ 2, 8; see also Supreme Court Judges, YOUR MO. CTS., 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133 [https://perma.cc/D5QG-7ZDL].  
Technically, Missouri judges are nonpartisan, appointed pursuant to the “Missouri 
Plan” under which a nonpartisan commission generates a list of three names and the 
Governor appoints someone from that list. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). Thereafter the 
judges face nonpartisan retention elections. Id. § 25(c)(1). Nevertheless, because the 
Governor is a political actor, the selection of Missouri’s Supreme Court Judges is not as 
nonpartisan as it might seem. See, e.g., Show Me the Judges, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 30, 
2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118843325339812916 [https://perma.cc/SBF9-D2W7] 
(“An ostensibly non-partisan seven-member commission chooses a slate of three nominees 
and the Governor chooses among them. The idea was to produce candidates based on merit 
while diluting political influence over courts. But that was then. Anybody with the power 
to choose judicial candidates was also destined to become a political actor. And that’s 
exactly what happened.”); see also Hans A. Linde, Selecting Oregon’s Judges, 33 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 671, 678 (2010) (suggesting that the current operation of the Missouri Plan 
“leaves governors to find back channels to get one name or another on the commission’s 
list”).  
 195 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). Chief Justice 
Michael A. Wolff (who became the Dean of St. Louis University School of Law), a 
member of the per curiam majority, ran for Attorney General as a Democrat and served as 
a special counsel to Democratic Governor Mel Carnahan. See Jake  
Wagman, Missouri Supreme Court Judge Michael A. Wolff to Step Down, ST. LOUIS  
POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/ 
missouri-supreme-court-judge-michael-a-wolff-to-step-down/article_9588c1c2-0d3d-5b69-
9057-9566b75a85f5.html [https://perma.cc/8R9T-W3PU]. Democratic Governors appointed 
three other members of the majority: Judges Laura Denvir Stith, Richard Teitelman, and 
Ronnie White. See Associated Press, Missouri Court Overturns Inmate’s Death Row 
Status, S.E. MISSOURIAN (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.semissourian.com/story/107876.html 
[https://perma.cc/XP89-MVCC] (listing affiliation of the Governor who appointed these 
Judges). Judge Charles Blackmar, also a member of the majority, was a Senior Judge who 
was appointed by Republican Governor Kit Bond and was eulogized after he died as a 
Republican, yet he spent his retired years promoting stem-cell research and advocating for 
the abolishment of the death penalty—both typically more liberal views. Charles Blakey 
Blackmar, ’42, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. (Apr. 18. 2007), http://paw.princeton.edu/ 
memorials/4/7/index.xml [https://perma.cc/Q9BN-J8LX]; Michael Wolff, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Mo., Eulogy, Charles B. Blackmar: Professor, Judge, Chief 
Justice ... and Charlie (Jan. 26, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
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Governors appointed all but one of these judges; the only Republican-
appointed Judge publicly supported certain issues traditionally associated with 
liberal views, such as abolishing the death penalty.196 The one dissenting 
Judge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the state lacked sufficient 
evidence regarding the existence of voter fraud, thereby deferring to the state’s 
voting process and narrowly construing the Missouri Constitution’s express 
conferral of the right to vote.197 That Judge is a noted conservative who 
publicly affiliates with the Federalist Society (a conservative legal 
organization).198 It is of course impossible to know whether any of these 
judge’s ideological affiliations influenced their views on the voter ID law. But 
regardless of the role ideology actually played in the decision, the fact is that 
the liberal judges all analyzed the individual constitutional right to vote more 
broadly than the conservative jurist in dissent. 
The same trend appeared in Wisconsin.199 Initially, two different 
Wisconsin trial courts invalidated the state’s voter ID law under the state 
constitution, concluding that the Wisconsin Constitution’s conferral of the 
right to vote goes beyond narrower federal jurisprudence.200 Democratic 
Governor Jim Doyle appointed one of those trial court judges, Richard 
                                                                                                                     
page.jsp?id=4814 [https://perma.cc/AY2C-QQJQ]). The final member of the majority 
decision, Judge Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, was a court of appeals judge sitting by 
designation on the Missouri Supreme Court; Democratic Governor Bob Holden appointed 
her to the bench. See Judge Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern 
District, YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1949 [https://perma.cc/ 
P67G-EE9G]; Virginia Young, Judges Hear Advice on Missouri Redistricting, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/judges-
hear-advice-on-missouri-redistricting/article_9562fba3-729e-5eda-bca7-f13b611776ff.html 
[https://perma.cc/P67G-EE9G]. 
 196 See Wolff, supra note 195. 
 197 See Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 227–29 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). 
 198 Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/ 
page.jsp?id=200 [https://perma.cc/LVW8-N5CM] (listing “Member, The Federalist 
Society”). Judge Limbaugh is now a Judge on the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri, receiving his appointment to the federal bench from 
Republican President George W. Bush. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 
Limbaugh, Stephen Nathaniel Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/ 
nGetInfo?jid=3177&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na [https://perma.cc/BHW4-LBWB]. 
Judge Limbaugh is a cousin of conservative talk radio personality Rush Limbaugh. Richa 
Naik, Missouri Is Creating a Bronze Statue of Rush Limbaugh, BUSINESS INSIDER  
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/missouri-is-creative-a-bronze-statue-of-
rush-limbaugh-2012-3 [https://perma.cc/82PR-GWCY]. 
 199 The Wisconsin Governor appoints many judges to fill vacant seats (although they 
must then run for election), so looking at the Governor’s party affiliation sheds some light 
on the ideology of the judge. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, 
NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/ [https://perma.cc/5B6U-S5J7] (listing the various 
judicial selection methods in all fifty states). 
 200 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 
2012 WL 763586, at *8 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP 
v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553, at *11 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012). 
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Niess.201 Republican Governor Tommy Thompson appointed the other judge, 
but after this voter ID decision, Wisconsin Republicans cried foul, claiming 
that the judge was politically biased because he had previously signed the 
recall petition against Republican Governor Scott Walker.202 The three-judge 
appellate court that reversed Judge Niess contained two liberals and one 
conservative, although the one conservative jurist actually authored the 
opinion.203 The Wisconsin Supreme Court then upheld the voter ID law in two 
opinions, one on a 4–3204 vote that followed the justices’ ideological 
predilections205 and the other on a 5–2 vote,206 again mostly along ideological 
lines.207 
                                                                                                                     
 201 See Richard Niess, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Richard_Niess [https:// 
perma.cc/5B6U-S5J7]. 
 202 See Daniel Bice, Judge in Voter ID Case Signed Walker Recall Petition, 
MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/ 
141650923.html [https://perma.cc/F76D-KD3W]; Editorial, Complaints Against Judge 
Flanagan Are Absurd, CAP. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2012), http://host.madison.com/news/opinion/ 
editorial/complaints-against-judge-flanagan-are-absurd/article_fdf70e74-6927-11e1-a31c-0 
019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/TM22-Z5Y4]. 
 203 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393, 
396–97 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 851 N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2014). Judge Lundsten, who 
wrote the opinion, is “widely regarded as a conservative”; Republican Governor Tommy 
Thompson initially appointed him to the bench, after which Judge Lundsten won election 
to his seat. See Steve Jagler, Voters Will Decide Fate of Walker’s Bill, ONMILWAUKEE.COM 
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://onmilwaukee.com/living/articles/jagler032311.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8NH6-L3P7]; Melissa McCord, Appointee Looks to Retain Spot on Court, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Mar. 28, 2001, at 3B. Judge Higginbotham was the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals’ first African-American jurist and received his judgeship from Democratic 
Governor Jim Doyle. See Historic Court Appointment, JET MAG., Nov. 10, 2003, at 33, 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-110459844.html [https://perma.cc/4K8H-U3DA]. He 
also applied for an appointment to the federal bench during Democratic President Barack 
Obama’s first term, suggesting that he leans toward a liberal ideology. See Associated 
Press, Judges, Lawyers Seek Federal Appeals Court Job, NBC15.COM (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://www.nbc15.com/news/state/headlines/62591442.html [https://perma.cc/7UQV-KA9F]. 
Judge Blanchard likely leans Democratic as well. See Dee J. Hall, Appeals Court Rejects 
Most of ‘John Doe’ Targets’ Motions, WIS. ST. J. (Jan 31, 2014), http://host.madison.com/ 
news/local/govt-and-politics/appeals-court-rejects-most-of-john-doe-targets-motions/article 
_3eeb32b1-2823-5f78-a0fe-46b74051ef73.html [https://perma.cc/WN6A-5DPQ]. He was 
elected to the court in 2010 and had the support of both Democrats and Republicans, but 
his campaign manager was a longtime Democratic consultant. See Editorial, For Court of 
Appeals: Brian Blanchard, CAP. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://host.madison.com/ 
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The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld its state’s voter ID law in 2011 by a 
6–1 vote.208 There is not a lot of information available about the ideology of 
the justices on this court, as they are officially nonpartisan and the justice’s 
backgrounds do not suggest much regarding their politics, but it is interesting 
to note that the only dissenting Justice was a Democratic appointee who was 
the court’s first African-American member.209 In his dissenting opinion, the 
Justice specifically invoked the country’s history of disenfranchising various 
groups such as African-Americans before noting that Georgia’s voter ID 
requirement placed similar unnecessary restrictions on the right to vote.210 
The connection between ideology and a justice’s vote in a voter ID case is 
perhaps strongest in states in which the justices are elected in partisan races. In 
these states, the voters themselves know the judges’ partisan affiliations, 
meaning that the justices’ decisions must hew more closely to the party line if 
they want to avoid electoral backlash.  
This rang true in Michigan. The Michigan Supreme Court split 5–2 along 
partisan lines in ruling that the state’s voter ID law was valid under 
Michigan’s Constitution, even though the state constitution goes beyond the 
U.S. Constitution in conferring the right to vote.211 The trend mostly held in 
Pennsylvania as well.212 In total, eight judges ruled on Pennsylvania’s voter ID 
law: two different trial court judges and six supreme court justices.213 All but 
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 208 Democratic Party of Ga. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 67 (Ga. 2011). 
 209 See Tom Crawford, State Supreme Court Upholds Voter ID Law, GA. REP.  
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 210 Democratic Party of Ga., 707 S.E.2d at 76 (Benham, J., dissenting) (“This country 
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 211 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 
N.W.2d 444, 444 (Mich. 2007); see Hasen, supra note 27, at 106. 
 212 Pennsylvania judges are elected in partisan races. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, 
Judicial Selection in the States: Pennsylvania, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/ 
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Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 
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one of the judges followed their ideological predilections, with Republican-
leaning judges narrowly interpreting the state constitution and approving the 
voter ID law, and Democratic-leaning judges ruling that it was invalid under 
the state constitution’s broader right-to-vote provision.214  
Although ideology can be a predictor of how a court will rule in a voter ID 
case, it of course does not always track each judge’s vote. The Tennessee 
Supreme Court, which has at least three Democratic-leaning members, ruled 
unanimously to uphold Tennessee’s voter ID law.215 Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana was split 3–2 between Democratic-leaning and Republican-
leaning judges in 2010216 when it upheld, by a 4–1 vote, Indiana’s voter ID 
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election. Of the four justices in the majority, three are Republicans. See Applewhite, 54 
A.3d at 1; Pennsylvania Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Pennsylvania_Supreme_Court [https://perma.cc/25B9-ECGX]. The two dissenting Justices 
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USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/17/ 
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 215 See City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 88 (Tenn. 2013); Andrea Zelinski, 
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(May 9, 2014), http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archives/2014/05/09/qanda-ron-
ramsey-on-his-controversial-push-against-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V8B8-5CB9] 
(noting that conservative Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey was leading a push against the 
retention of the three “Democratic Supreme Court justices” on the court).  
 216 See Gerald L. Bepko, A Tribute to Justice Theodore Boehm, 44 IND. L. REV. 341, 
343 (2011) (noting that Justice Boehm was involved in Democratic politics); Brent 
Dickson, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Brent_Dickson [https://perma.cc/8TEG-
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law under the state constitution.217 Notably, however, the dissenting justice 
was very involved in Democratic politics before he was a judge.218 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of Indiana decided this case in the shadow of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision upholding the exact same law in Crawford, albeit 
under the federal constitution, likely making it harder to issue an opinion that 
went the opposite way—unless the court properly interpreted the state 
constitution as going further than the federal Equal Protection Clause.219 That 
is, a decision hewing to federal protection was easy in light of a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case on the same law, even though the correct analysis would 
have shown that Indiana’s Constitution provides more robust protection to the 
right to vote than the U.S. Constitution. 
These examples show that not every Democratic or liberal judge is going 
to invalidate a voter ID law, and not every Republican or conservative judge is 
going to uphold a voter ID requirement, but there is still a discernable trend, 
particularly regarding the scope of protection afforded to the constitutional 
right to vote under state constitutions. It may not be possible to categorize all 
judges along an ideological spectrum, and a judge’s constitutional analysis on 
this issue may have nothing to do with his or her personal ideological 
predilections.220 Moreover, voter ID laws come in different shapes and sizes, 
and some laws—such as the ones in Colorado or Rhode Island221—are more 
lenient and do not necessarily infringe the fundamental right to vote because 
there is really no added burden on voters. Regardless, the analysis shows that 
who is deciding these cases can matter a great deal because liberal-leaning 
judges seem to understand more clearly that state constitutions provide broad 
protection to the individual right to vote that goes beyond federal 
jurisprudence. 
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Unlike the moderate correlation between ideology and a judge’s views on 
voter ID, however, there does not appear to be as much of a link between a 
judge’s partisan background and his or her analysis on felon 
disenfranchisement laws. A Republican Governor appointed all three judges in 
California who broadened the right to vote for felons by limiting the scope of 
the state’s felon disenfranchisement rule.222 The Washington Supreme Court 
split in deciding that a convicted criminal must pay the full amount of 
restitution before regaining his or her voting rights, with Democratic-leaning 
justices in both the majority and dissent.223 Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court split 3–2 in ruling that the state could not disenfranchise a felon whose 
crime was not classified as “infamous”; Democratic Governor Phil Bredesen 
appointed both the majority and dissenting authors, and both jurists were the 
target of conservative groups during their retention election campaigns.224 In 
sum, judges from all ideological perspectives have ruled both broadly and 
narrowly on the issue of felons and the right to vote. 
The lack of a clear link between ideology and felon disenfranchisement 
rulings might stem from the long history of felon disenfranchisement in the 
United States,225 making it less of an issue of first impression and not as 
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ideological as voter ID requirements. Moreover, although policy views on 
felon disenfranchisement may fall along partisan lines,226 judges will not 
necessarily follow suit, especially given that many state constitutions—and, 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Constitution—explicitly 
endorse the practice.227 That is, there is legal imprimatur within state 
constitutions to uphold felon disenfranchisement laws and reject challenges to 
limit their scope, which might trump a judge’s personal ideological 
predilections. 
Much like with the rulings on felon disenfranchisement laws, the evidence 
is mixed regarding a connection between a judge’s ideology and his or her 
analysis of rules involving the voting process. On the one hand, there appears 
to be little correlation in some cases. Both Republican-appointed and 
Democratic-appointed judges rejected the argument that DRE voting machines 
violate the constitutional right to vote for some individuals.228 A Republican-
appointed judge wrote the Missouri appellate decision criticizing the trial court 
judge’s broader ruling that extended the polling hours during the 2000 
presidential election, but the court was unanimous.229  
Then again, a judge’s own biases regarding the outcome of a disputed 
election could potentially affect the scope of a decision on voting rights.230 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the 2008 Norm Coleman-Al Franken U.S. 
Senate dispute, initially ruled 3–2 along ideological lines in a preliminary 
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decision,231 but it ultimately was unanimous in adopting a narrow “strict 
compliance” standard for absentee voting that limited the constitutional right 
to vote by refusing to count some ballots.232 The fact that the court set out a 
narrow rule on voting rights (normally a more conservative position), with an 
application that resulted in the Democratic candidate winning the election, 
perhaps helped the court reach unanimity, as each side “won” something in the 
case. The same might have been true in a Tennessee post-election dispute, 
albeit going the opposite way: a Republican-appointed judge issued an opinion 
adopting a lenient standard for complying with the voting process, which is 
typically a more liberal stance, yet the decision affirmed the election of a 
conservative-leaning judge.233  
In sum, although not every case follows this trend, liberal-leaning judges 
seem to interpret the constitutional right to vote more broadly than 
conservative judges, particularly for highly salient and partisan issues like 
voter ID. Typically, conservative judges will favor states’ rights and state 
sources of law over federal power as a general matter, but the right-to-vote 
cases reverse this truism, as liberal judges seem more likely to protect the 
broader grant of the fundamental right to vote within state constitutions. This 
data can contribute to the ongoing discussion of the kinds of judges we should 
put on the bench. 
B. Judicial Selection and Decision-Making on the Right to Vote  
The voting rights cases discussed above generally involved challenges to a 
state law that had the effect of making it harder for typically disfavored groups 
to vote, such as poor people, minorities, felons, or the disabled. Perhaps judges 
are more likely to rule broadly in construing voting rights for these individuals 
if the judges are more isolated from the political process by being appointed 
instead of elected, or if they face merely a retention election instead of a 
campaign against an opponent. Prior studies show that elected judges tend to 
pay more attention to public opinion than appointed judges or judges who 
must win only a “yes” or “no” retention vote to stay on the bench.234 Retention 
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elections for appointed judges are usually boring affairs with little political 
drama,235 but elected judges must actively campaign because they must beat 
an opponent who also wants the seat.236 The theory, then, is that elected judges 
may be less likely to rule in favor of a political minority than an appointed 
judge who will not worry as much about the potential backlash from a 
vigorous campaign.237 The initial evidence suggests that for issues that are not 
already highly ideological, appointed judges or those who will face only 
retention elections are better at broadly construing the right to vote and 
including political minorities in the democratic process.238 This finding adds 
data to the robust and complex debate over methods of judicial selection.239 
For example, judges that narrowed the reach of felon disenfranchisement 
laws—thereby including convicted individuals in the electorate and espousing 
a broader view of the right to vote—sat on courts with appointed judiciaries 
and retention elections. Courts in California, Iowa, and Tennessee ruled that 
the state could not disenfranchise the plaintiffs who brought suit, thus limiting 
the scope of felon disenfranchisement; judges in these states are appointed 
initially and must withstand retention elections to keep their seats.240 The 
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judges that were stricter toward voting rights for felons, rejecting challenges to 
the application of the laws, faced regular judicial elections. The Alabama 
Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court both issued opinions 
upholding the laws and narrowly construing the constitutional right to vote for 
felons; justices on these courts are elected.241 This makes sense: felons are not 
the most sympathetic group, so a judge facing an election against an opponent 
(as opposed to just a “yes” or “no” on retention) might be wary of issuing a 
ruling in favor of felon voting rights for fear that it will become a major 
campaign issue. 
Decisions on the voting process seem to follow this trend as well, with 
elected judiciaries ruling narrowly toward voting rights and appointed judges 
issuing opinions that more broadly interpret the constitutional right to vote. 
For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—selected through partisan 
elections—analyzed the right to vote very narrowly in disenfranchising 
absentee voters who did not strictly comply with the rules for delivering their 
ballots.242 The Minnesota Supreme Court, also comprised of judges who must 
face an election, similarly required strict compliance with voting rules to have 
an absentee ballot count.243 But the Tennessee Court of Appeals—selected by 
the Governor with retention elections—ruled more broadly in allowing voters 
to violate an election statute to effectuate and protect the constitutional right to 
vote.244 Similarly, an Arizona appellate court—chosen through merit 
selection—was more sympathetic to the argument that DRE machines might 
negatively impact voters such as disabled people than both the Georgia and 
Texas courts, which contain judges who face regular contested elections.245 
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This observation is not meant to suggest that the Arizona ruling was correct 
and the Texas and Georgia rulings wrong as a legal matter, but only to point 
out one variable that might make a difference in whether judges are likely to 
interpret voting rights broadly for typically disfavored voters. 
But the connection between the method of judicial selection and the scope 
of the opinion on voting rights does not hold for voter ID laws, likely 
reflecting the sheer partisanship of this issue. Appointed and elected judges 
have ruled both ways in these cases. For instance, both Missouri and 
Tennessee appoint their supreme court judges, who then face retention 
elections, and yet the courts ruled in opposite ways on voter ID.246 Similarly, 
the elected justices in Pennsylvania expressed skepticism on the 
constitutionality of that state’s voter ID requirement, but the elected justices in 
Michigan upheld the law.247 As voter ID is such a partisan issue,248 often 
debated in state legislatures along partisan lines, perhaps ideology simply wins 
out in the judiciary as well.  
To the extent that further data-driven evidence confirms that appointed 
judges may be more likely to construe voting rights broadly as compared to 
elected judges, we can use this information as part of the debate on judicial 
selection.249 As an initial matter, the evidence on state voting rights cases 
suggests that, when the issue does not come down to pure partisanship, 
appointed judges may be better positioned to construe the state-based right to 
vote robustly and thereby include more political minorities in the democratic 
process. 
C. Selecting State Judges Who Espouse the Ideal of a Broad 
Fundamental Right to Vote 
As I have explained in previous work,250 we should view the constitutional 
right to vote as the most important, fundamental right in our entire democratic 
structure.251 Courts should therefore issue rulings in favor of expansive voter 
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access, always with an eye to effectuating the constitutional right to vote.252 It 
follows that we should select judges who espouse this value. 
A failure to choose judges who understand the importance of allowing 
every member of society to participate in our democratic process risks creating 
courts that issue decisions undermining the very legitimacy of that democracy. 
Take, for instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion about whether 
absentee voters had to return their ballots in person themselves or could have a 
third party deliver the ballots for them.253 Recall that local election officials 
had explicitly told voters before Election Day that they could allow a third 
party to deliver the ballots and that these votes would count.254 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a ruling that is extremely narrow for 
effectuating the constitutional right to vote, reversed that position.255 The 
court’s decision was grounded in a concern over potential voter fraud in the 
delivery of absentee ballots.256 But devoid of evidence of fraud with these 
actual ballots, the result was the disenfranchisement of fifty-six voters who 
had relied on the county’s official pronouncement. Even if the state has a 
legitimate interest in rooting out absentee ballot fraud in general, the decision 
was particularly concerning for that election and for those voters given that 
local election officials had said absentee voters could cast their ballots this 
way. These votes may have altered who won, undermining the democratic 
legitimacy of the person elected. The media hardly took notice of this drastic 
opinion striking down a “long-standing practice by election boards across the 
state,” with only a short mention in an AP alert.257 Other judges, who would 
construe the constitutional right to vote more broadly, might have come to a 
different conclusion that would be more protective of the fundamental right to 
vote.258 
How do we find these judges? First, as discussed earlier, we need to pay 
more attention to the kinds of analyses our current state judges employ on 
issues involving voting rights. This scrutiny will help us discern whether 
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judicial rulings reflect our core values regarding democratic participation. 
Legal analysis has nuance, and a judge that values individual voting rights 
over state regulation of elections has a different view on the meaning of the 
constitutional right to vote than a judge who is more deferential to state 
regulation of the voting process. We need judges who will recognize that state 
constitutions go further than federal law in explicitly conferring the right to 
vote to all citizens. Second, to the extent there is any connection between the 
ideology of the judges deciding these cases and their judicial opinions, as is 
the case with voter ID, we can use that evidence to influence Governors, 
appointing commissions, and voters on the merits of the individuals seeking 
judicial office.259 Finally, if the mode of analysis differs based on the method 
of judicial selection, as it appears to do for certain issues such as felon 
disenfranchisement, then we should use this data to inform the debate over 
how we select our judiciary. 
This Article does some heavy lifting on the first inquiry—shedding more 
light on the role of state courts in dictating the scope of the right to vote. It also 
offers some preliminary thoughts on the second and third points. 
Debate on these substantive issues should be a greater part of the judicial 
selection process itself. This proposal is not meant to suggest that judicial 
selection should become more partisan or ideological than it already is. In an 
ideal world, judges would be truly “independent” and decide cases solely 
according to the “law.” But that is unrealistic, for two reasons. First, the law is 
not so clear that there is always one true answer. Reasonable people can differ 
on whether they value the constitutional right to vote over state regulation of 
elections, or vice versa. When selecting a judge, then, we are making a choice 
between these options. We should do so consciously and deliberately. Second, 
judicial selection is already partisan, especially for elected judiciaries. We 
ignore the kinds of judges we select, and their likely ruling on issues of 
importance such as the right to vote, at our peril.  
V. CONCLUSION 
State judges have a tremendous impact on how we understand the right to 
vote. When judges interpret the state-based constitutional right to vote broadly, 
they provide the best safeguard for the most fundamental right in our society. 
By contrast, when judges narrowly construe the constitutional protection for 
voting, they improperly constrict the import of the explicit conferral of voting 
rights within state constitutions.  
As a scholarly community and a democratic society, we have failed to 
analyze state court decisions on voting rights in any robust and holistic manner 
to recognize these differences. Studying the cases demonstrates how some 
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judges properly interpret the right to vote robustly and independently from the 
U.S. Constitution, while other judges simply follow federal guidance and 
thereby provide only narrow protection. This limited analysis, however, 
conflicts both with the explicit conferral of the right to vote within state 
constitutions and our overall concept of voting as the foundation of our 
democracy. 
Beyond advocating for broader rulings as a legal matter, the preliminary 
evidence suggests that we should consider a potential judge’s views on 
election law issues when vetting them and that decisions on voting rights 
should inform the continuing debate on judicial selection. Ultimately, if as a 
society we believe that the right to vote is among the most precious, 
fundamental rights we enjoy, then we should choose our state judges based on 
whether they will broadly interpret that state-based right. The initial data 
suggests that, at least in some contexts, liberal and appointed judges may be 
better suited at safeguarding voting as a fundamental right than their 
conservative and elected counterparts. 
There is a role for the public as well. We need to educate ourselves about 
the positions of those who seek judicial office on issues of importance such as 
the rules for an election, and then vote accordingly. By becoming more 
informed citizens, we can influence state courts to make smarter decisions in 
upholding the fundamental, constitutional right to vote. 
